Saturday, May 09, 2020
Can a contact phone app work in a democratic society?
With lockdown extended for another three months in Wales, and with England due to follow suit, albeit with some relaxation of the rules, the UK Government appears to be placing all its hopes on us returning to normality on a phone app.
As ABC News reports, this has worked very well in China, where the Chinese government has begun to track some of its citizens through software that analyses their personal data to sort individuals into color-coded categories – red, yellow or green – corresponding to their health status and level of risk for COVID-19.
However, will it work here, where we value our freedoms and are not just suspicious of state overreach but actually have the ability to refuse to cooperate? Parliament's Human Rights Committee has some legitimate concerns.
As the Mirror reports, they want an independent scrutiny body to be created to keep tabs on how the app is being used. The app, which was designed on the advice of NCSC, an arm of GCHQ, the government's surveillance agency, is currently being tested on the Isle of Wight:
The government has claimed all the data collected by the app would be anonymous and users privacy would be protected.
But in a report pubished today the committee warned these assurances would "carry no weight" unless the government was prepared to pass a law setting out how data gathered could be "used, stored and disposed of."
NHSX has drawn criticism for choosing to gather data from users of the app in a centralised database, rather than using a system offered by Apple and Google which would store most data on the user's own phone.
Critics say the centralised version puts the data at risk of hacking and fraud.
The committee said a new body should be formed to keep tabs on the app - and it shouldn't be the Information Commissioner's Office, which was involved in the app's development.
And they warned the app would be useless if the public didn't trust the government with its data. The report said: "The amount of data the contact tracing app requires on the private and family lives of individuals is not justifiable if the app does not contribute meaningfully to the easing of lockdown restrictions and the combatting of Covid-19."
It added: "Uptake will be lower without user confidence in privacy protections—therefore robust privacy protections are themselves key to effectiveness of the app and the digital contact tracing system." The committee also called on the government to commit to reviewing the app every 21 days and to publish an impact assessment on how the data is being used.
The government claim that users can delete the app and its data whenever they want but this is not entirely accurate. While users can delete the app, and any data held on their phones, this does not delete any data held on the government's server.
While these doubts remain, it is unlikely that this app will gain the widespread acceptance it needs to be effective.
As ABC News reports, this has worked very well in China, where the Chinese government has begun to track some of its citizens through software that analyses their personal data to sort individuals into color-coded categories – red, yellow or green – corresponding to their health status and level of risk for COVID-19.
However, will it work here, where we value our freedoms and are not just suspicious of state overreach but actually have the ability to refuse to cooperate? Parliament's Human Rights Committee has some legitimate concerns.
As the Mirror reports, they want an independent scrutiny body to be created to keep tabs on how the app is being used. The app, which was designed on the advice of NCSC, an arm of GCHQ, the government's surveillance agency, is currently being tested on the Isle of Wight:
The government has claimed all the data collected by the app would be anonymous and users privacy would be protected.
But in a report pubished today the committee warned these assurances would "carry no weight" unless the government was prepared to pass a law setting out how data gathered could be "used, stored and disposed of."
NHSX has drawn criticism for choosing to gather data from users of the app in a centralised database, rather than using a system offered by Apple and Google which would store most data on the user's own phone.
Critics say the centralised version puts the data at risk of hacking and fraud.
The committee said a new body should be formed to keep tabs on the app - and it shouldn't be the Information Commissioner's Office, which was involved in the app's development.
And they warned the app would be useless if the public didn't trust the government with its data. The report said: "The amount of data the contact tracing app requires on the private and family lives of individuals is not justifiable if the app does not contribute meaningfully to the easing of lockdown restrictions and the combatting of Covid-19."
It added: "Uptake will be lower without user confidence in privacy protections—therefore robust privacy protections are themselves key to effectiveness of the app and the digital contact tracing system." The committee also called on the government to commit to reviewing the app every 21 days and to publish an impact assessment on how the data is being used.
The government claim that users can delete the app and its data whenever they want but this is not entirely accurate. While users can delete the app, and any data held on their phones, this does not delete any data held on the government's server.
While these doubts remain, it is unlikely that this app will gain the widespread acceptance it needs to be effective.
