.comment-link {margin-left:.6em;}

Thursday, July 07, 2016

The five ways Chilcot contradicted Tony Blair

I freely admit that I have not read all 2.6 million words of the Chilcott report or even fully perused the 200 pages of the executive summary. So I am grateful to the Independent for getting to the heart of the matter and identifying the five things Tony Blair said about the Iraq War which were completely undermined by Chilcot:

1. Saddam Hussein won't co-operate, we have no choice

Chilcot said: “We have concluded that the UK chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted. Military action at that time was not a last resort."

2. Iraq's weapons of mass destruction could be activated in just 45 minutes

Chilcot said: “The judgements about Iraq’s capabilities in that statement and in the dossier published the same day were presented with a certainty that was not justified. The Joint Intelligence Committee should have made clear to Mr Blair that the assessed intelligence had not established beyond doubt either that Iraq continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, or that efforts to develop nuclear weapons continued."

3. The UK can influence US decisions, we have a special relationship

Chilcot said: "Some [lessons] about the management of relations with allies, especially the US. Mr Blair overestimated his ability to influence US decisions on Iraq. The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ."

4. Removing Saddam Hussein will make Britons safer

“Mr Blair had been warned, however, that military action would increase the threat from Al Qaeda to the UK and to UK interests. He had also been warned that an invasion might lead to Iraq’s weapons and capabilities being transferred into the hands of terrorists."

5. The ensuing chaos in Iraq could not have been predicted

“Despite explicit warnings, the consequences of the invasion were underestimated. The planning and preparations for Iraq after Saddam Hussein were wholly inadequate.„"

Undoubtedly more will emerge as the full report is digested but already Blair's legacy is being unpicked and the decision to go to war shown up as being based on a false premise.
Comments: Post a Comment

<< Home

This page is powered by Blogger. Isn't yours?